People choose friendships with people similar to themselves, i.e. they sort by resemblence. Economic studies have shown when sorting is optimal and constitute an equilibrium, however, this presumes lack of beneficial spillovers. We investigate formation of economic and social networks where agents may form or cut ties. We combine a setup with link formation where agents have types that determine the value of a connection. We provide conditions for sorting in friendships, i.e. that agents tend to partner only with those with those sufficiently similar to themselves. Conditions are provided with and without beneficial spillovers from indirect connections. We show that sorting may be suboptimal, yet a socially stable outcome, despite otherwise obeying the conditions for sorting in Becker (1973) . We analyse policy tools to mitigate suboptimal sorting. Another feature is that agents with higher value are more central in networks under certain conditions; a side effect is sorting by degree centrality under certain conditions. Finally we illustrate the limits to patterns of sorting and centrality.
Introduction
A ubiquitous finding in studies of social relations is the tendency to form more ties with people similar to one-self, i.e. the pattern known as sorting or homophily cf. the meta-study by McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) . Economic research has contributed to the understanding of sorting by providing mathematically sufficient conditions for when marriage-labor markets and groups get sorted and when this is optimal. However, no research has reconciled the framework of Becker (1973) on sorting with the literature on network formation as pioneered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . Our investigation yields new insights on network formation by rational agents: when is sorting stable and optimal if beneficial network externalities are either not present or present, and; which other patterns arise in these stable networks? In addition we demonstrate how policies may be enacted that can curb sorting when excessive, and thus provide higher welfare.
These new insights may help policymakers to optimally design schools or corporations.
While a modest tendency to sort may be beneficial by forming smaller communities that encourage trust and shared values, however, too much sorting can be detrimental. The problems of sorting include slowing down the spread of information and higher inequality. 1 As recent decades have seen a rise in residential income segregation and assortative mating by education it is a great concern for policy makers how to tackle sorting. 2 The insights from our analysis can be applied to understand the the indirect effects of sorting. For instance when dividing school cohorts by ability as is the current practice in many countries, cf. OECD (2012).
Our framework explores a setting with agents choosing partners under three core assumptions.
First, agents are heterogeneous in type for creating value in partnerships (this is in line with research on peer effects). 3 Type may refer to productive and non-productive capabilities such as skill, social aptitude or interests and ethnicity. Second, there are possible externalities from friends of friends as in the 'connections model' of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) which captures spillovers of ideas and favors (which does not contain types). Third, agents choose a limited number of partners reflecting constraints of time and effort. 4 Note our framework could also model corporations or self-governing organizations forming bilateral partnerships among themselves.
In this setting we investigate robustness of network structures in the following sense: no agents can form and/or delete links from network and be better off when allowing for transfers of utility. Although the literature on formation of networks under externalities is vast the share that investigates heterogeneous agents has been limited. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) pioneered in their investigation of tension between stability and efficiency under mutual acceptance of links.
A related investigation of non-mutually accepted links was pioneered by Bala and Goyal (2000) .
The most relevant paper is Marti and Zenou (2016) which also investigates segregation in a model with complementarity and externalities. 5 Another relevant paper is Goeree, Riedl, and Ule (2009) which explores network formation and structure when there is value heterogeneity, i.e. some agent types make links formed more valuable.
Contributions Below we list our contributions to the literature and discuss some applications.
The results contribute mainly to our understanding of network formation and assortative matching. Some of our results are derived when only evaluating links that are formed between a pair of agents -this corresponds to pairwise (Nash) equilibrium. Other results require that any coalition of agents can form links between themselves, i.e. the strong (Nash) equilibrium. 6 The first contribution is towards the understanding of conditions for sorting. We establish sufficient conditions for stable networks to exhibit sorting in type. In the simple case without externalities our Proposition 1 extend the classic work to a one-sided matching setting with many partners. In the case of externalities we provide a characterization for the set of pairwise (Nash) stable networks: when Becker 1973's complementarity hold then that set coincides with the set of perfectly sorted networks where every agent within a given type is connected and uses its quota of links; see Theorem 1 for the case of non-constant decay (or Theorem 2 in Appendix C for constant decay). 7 We also show that although these networks are stable they are not efficient when there is a moderate level of externalities due to a lack of connectivity across types. This problem of sub-optimality is shown to be mitigated through policy, see Proposition 2. Finally our Proposition 3 establishes that if the agent population is large then sorting is the unique strongly stable outcome (i.e. the core) when Becker's complementarity hold and there is constant decay. 8
The above generalization of sorting can be applied to investigate models of homophily in social networks. Moreover, we provide a clear intuition how pathological sorting can constitute an undesirable, yet, stable configuration of a social network. The intuition is analogue to a classic public goods problem: there is a lack in the provision of links across types. This result also can be seen as providing a generic network structure, which is commonly observed, and that suffers from inefficiencies in network formation. Finally, to mitigate the sorting issue we demonstrate the validity of a policy instrument that provides incentives to link across types.
The second contribution is to bring the literature on network structure into the research on game theory and network formation. Our focus on structure is limited to measures of network centrality for individuals. We show that if a monotonicity condition on contribution to the value of link in type is satisfied then high type agents are more central in all stable networks; see Propositions 4 and 6. Without externalities sorting in degree emerges, see Proposition 5, if the conditions for sorting by type and degree centrality are met. An application of this result is that sorting by type may be detected simply from the network structure if there is sorting by degree.
Our final contribution is to display the limits to conditions for sorting and centrality. This is done by showing that a network where a low type agent is excessively central can be stable, see Example 2 and Corollary 2. When the conditions for monotonicity condition for centrality are satisfied this entails a less productive agent could be replaced in a central position and thus everyone could be better off. This highlights another fundamental network configuration which is undesirable under pairwise link formation. This can be applied to understand how some agents can maintain their central brokering position although this is detrimental.
Related literature
The following paragraphs compare our results with the most relevant studies among existing work by assessing the contributions above. As there is a large body of literature the review is limited to only the most similar and noteworthy.
The most relevant paper on sorting is Marti and Zenou (2016) which investigates conditions for segregation/sorting in networks with externalities but with noteworthy differences (see below).
As our setup builds on an assortative matching framework, unlike Marti and Zenou (2016) , we can directly compare our results with those already established. The work related to stability of sorting has a strong tradition for two-sided matching e.g. labor and dating markets starting with Becker (1973) . The research on one-sided assortative matching, i.e. the basis for our setup, has been limited to formation of clubs (not networks) under various technologies cf. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) , Kremer (1993) , Durlauf and Seshadri (2003) , Legros and Newman (2002) , Pycia (2012) , Baccara and Yariv (2013) . All the work on one-sided assortative matching find conditions for sorting which is similar to type complementarity in Becker (1973) . Yet, none of these papers allow for linking between groups nor consider network externalities which are the extensions we treat. Note that Proposition 1 can be seen as a direct extension of the classic result by Becker (1973) for networks without externalities -our contribution is to propose a new measure of sorting which is tractable in equilibrium.
We contribute to the knowledge on sorting under externalities by building upon Marti and Zenou (2016) . In terms of equilibrium outcomes we remove their requirement that either one or all agents of a given type are linked to all other agents of the same type (i.e. respectively a star or a clique). Such a requirement imposes an unrealistic structure implying that an agent may possess infinitely many links. 9 Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of pairwise (Nash) equilibria for moderate externalities. Furthermore, we demonstrate that for large populations sorting constitutes the unique strongly stable outcome under asymptotic independence of externalities. Thus we advance their results on sorting by making them apply more widely by allowing for variation in structures of the subnetworks and for multiple types of agents (see details accompanying each result) while keeping the number of links bounded for each agent.
The divergence in results from Marti and Zenou (2016) are driven by their choice of modeling complementarity as endogenous while ours is exogenous. 10 Other essential differences are: we employ convex costs where they use linear, and; we use pairwise Nash stability which is stricter than their pairwise stability. 11
Research on suboptimal networks under externalities has a long tradition (cf. Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) ; Katz and Shapiro (1985) ; Farrell and Saloner (1986), and; Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) ). 12 Our contribution for inefficient networks is not to provide any new generic insights on suboptimal network formation; instead we show two new classes of inefficient networks. The first class of inefficient networks suffers from an excessive level of sorting captured by Theorems 9 Infinite number of links occur when there are many agents of same type -at least one agent links with all other. 10 The endogenous complementarity implies that sorting may be self-reinforcing as the incentive to sort increases in other agents tendency to sort.
11 Pairwise Nash stability allows for substitution of partners. For instance when there are no externalities then pairwise stability does not always predict sorting despite the conditions of Becker (1973) being satisfied.
12 Note our concept of pairwise stability differs from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) -see Section 2 (the model).
1 and 2 (see last paragraph for second class). Marti and Zenou (2016) also investigates sorting which is suboptimal despite being stable -thus this part of their analysis is subject to the same critique as their results on sorting (see above). Moreover, their result on inefficiency only holds when there are a handful of agents of each type (see discussion accompanying Theorem 1 for details). On the contrary, our result on inefficient sorting holds for any number of agents and only requires a connected subnetwork within a given type -this reveals that the scope of the underlying problem is much wider. Another, perhaps more profound difference, is that the source of inefficiency in their setting is different: their endogenous incentive to sorting implies that the penalty from linking across types is removed when no agents sort (i.e. sort negatively) -thus there are always beneficial spillovers from connecting across types. Thus inefficiency is due to a lack of coordination rather than misaligned incentives.
Our results on centrality relate to work within economics and network science. The only relevant economic research related to the relationship between type and centrality is Goeree, Riedl, and Ule (2009). They show in two examples a star network with a high value agent in center is efficient and Nash stable. Note their analysis is under one-way formation links and lacks a unique prediction. 13 In their experiments the efficient network emerges more often and the frequency increases with repetitions. The work that relates most to sorting in degree is Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009). Note although degree sorting in their model comes from the composition of types while this paper relies only on preferences. There are non-economic models in statistical physics which predict sorting in degree, yet, these have no strategic considerations.
The most prominent is preferential attachment, see Barabasi and Albert (1999) . 14 Note that an analogy to our pattern of degree sorting is found in Kremer (1993) and Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) where more productive groups can sustain a larger scale of organizations.
Our results on the limits of sorting indicate that an agent can amass so much network capital that the agent becomes the most central despite not being the best candidate. In these networks there is a failure of sorting and monotonic centrality. The work on network externalities in two-sided settings by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1986) find an analogous pattern. In their setups the source to inefficiency is that a suboptimal producer is supplying the consumers who cannot coordinate on choosing the better producer and get "locked-in".
Paper organization The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Section 3 investigates sorting and its potential sub-optimality; Section 4 analyzes the network structure implied by the model; Section 5 rounds up the analysis by outlining the limits to sorting and network structure, and; Section 6 concludes in a discussion of assumptions. All 13 Other star networks are also stable. Moreover, star networks where periphery agents pay for links may be strongly stable (for some parameters) due to absense in transfers of utility.
14 A drawback of preferential attachment is that including a parameter of attractiveness similar to value heterogeneity then there is negative degree assortativity, cf. Pastor-Satorras, Vazquez, and Vespignani (2001) . In a related model Konig, Tessone, and Zenou (2010) shows through simulation that when allowing for preferential attachment with local search (through friends) and capacity constraints (similar to our framework) then degree assortativity also emerges. type z ij = z(x i , x j ). The function z is assumed twice differentiable as well as taking positive and bounded values. 15 Let the (total) link value be defined as the value of linking for the pair, i.e.
The two components, network and linking value, are further restricted in the subsequent sections depending on their usage.
The game framework This paper explores a static setting of one period. Agents' information about payoffs of other agents is complete. Together the players, action, utility and information constitutes a game we will now outline the stability concept for.
Any pair of agents can transfer 'utility' between them. Let a net-transfer from agent j to agent i be denoted as τ ij ∈ R such that τ ij = −τ ji which implies non-wastefulness of utility. The matrix of net transfers is denoted τ . For each agent i its net-payoff is defined as s i = u i (µ) + Στ ij .
In addition it is assumed that the net-transfer between two agents with a link can only be changed if this is mutually agreed or the link is broken.
Stability We define network stability using the concept of coalitional moves. A coalition t is blocking a network µ with net-transfers τ if there is a feasible coalitional move from network µ to networkμ withτ where all members in t have higher net-payoff after the move.
We employ two concepts of stability. The first is strong stability: this is satisfied for a network if there exist transfers such that no coalition (of any size) may have a feasible move which is profitable for all its members. The second concept, pairwise (Nash) stability, is similar but has weaker requirements: it holds when there exist transfers such that no coalitions of at most two agents may block. The sets of stable networks are denoted respectively M s−stb and M p−stb . A discussion of the stability concepts and its relation to the literature is found in Section 6.
Our pairwise definition of stability is stricter than that of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . However, the stricter requirement is to allow for substitution of links (simultaneous deletion and formation) which is a standard requirement in the matching literature.
A noteworthy feature is that strongly stability implies pairwise stability; thus any condition valid for pairwise stability also applies to strong stability. In addition without network externalities every pairwise stable network is also strongly stable, see Lemma 1. Note also that any strongly stable network requires efficiency (coalition of all agents can implement any network).
Thus we can employ efficiency to derive structure in strongly stable networks.
Sorting in type
This section investigates stratification in type, i.e. based on the agents' exogenous types. In this section we employ the degree quota. Recall that no linking surplus means that any agent i must 15 The upper bound rules out an infinite number of links in equilibrium. 16 Note most results use only the total link value. However, the results in Section 5 rely on decomposability of total link value into individual link value. use all possible links, i.e. k i = κ. The no linking surplus will be a requirement in most equilibria in this section.
In order to derive results a restriction of payoffs is necessary. Recall the total link value is the sum of individual link for the two partners in the pair. The essential feature of the total link value for sorting is complementarity in type. Becker (1973) shows that type complementarity holds when: Definition 1. The link value has supermodularity if ∂ 2 ∂x∂y Z(x, y) > 0 -this entails:
The concept of sorting that we employ is a generalization of the sorting when there is a single partner such as Becker's marriage market. The shape of sorting is such that a high type agent has partners which weakly dominate in type when compared partner-by-partner with the partners of a lower type agent. Note the comparison is done over the sorted set of partners type X . The sorting pattern is mathematically defined as:
Definition 2. Sorting in type holds in µ if for all pair i, j such that x i > x j it holds that:
Definition 3. A network µ is perfect sorted (in type) if x i = x j for any ij ∈ µ. Denote the set of perfectly sorted networks as M p−srt .
No externalities
We begin with the setting where network externalities are absent and thus indirect connections are irrelevant. Our first result is that sorting in type emerges under similar conditions as in Becker (1973) when network externalities are absent:
If there is supermodularity and no externalities then for any pairwise stable network there is sorting in type.
In the following subsections we extent results to a setting with externalities. Note that the presence of externalities may imply sorting is not always equilibrium outcome -see Example 2
and Corollary 2.
Externalities
We proceed to a more general context where indirect connections matter for utility. Whenever we allow for externalities we restrict our attention to network of either:
where 1 ∈(1,∞) (l) is the Dirac measure/indicator function of whether 1 < l < ∞. The setting with constant decay corresponds to benefits from linking in the 'connections-model' from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . Note that hyperbolic decay is a special case where there is no decay beyond that at distance of two.
Finite population In the following paragraphs we reexamine our results on sorting by illustrating a class of sorted networks that are suboptimal when introducing network externalities.
The sub-optimality holds despite fulfilling supermodularity. We begin here by exhibiting a simple example where the problem emerge.
Excessive sorting refers to a network with perfect sorting according to type where the segregated groups could collectively benefit from connecting. However, they fail to connect as incentives do not internalize externalities under pairwise network formation. The relevant set of networks are those networks which are perfectly sorted but within each type all agents are connected. Let networks which are perfectly sorted and connected among each type be denoted:
The aim is to show there exist an open region of thresholds (δ,δ) such that if the level of externalities is within the region then any network in M p−srt:conn where there is no degree surplus is pairwise (Nash) stable for some transfers τ but inefficient. An introduction to this problem is found in Example 1 below in a stylized, simple manner. The example is graphically represented in Figure 1 . that for a range of decay-factors that µ is pairwise stable yet suboptimal.
In this setup there is a unique move which is both feasible and payoff relevant. forming a link while deleting links to 3 and 4 which we denoteμ = µ ∪ {16}\{13, 46} and seen as Figure 1 .B. Benefits for agents 1 and 6 from network µ and deviating from it are:
The condition for deviating toμ not being pairwise profitable is u 1 (µ)+u 6 (µ) > u 1 (μ)+u 6 (μ); this is sufficient for pairwise stability due to payoff symmetry in µ and no transfers.
We now turn to deriving condition for when segregating is inefficient. The aggregate benefits over all agents of the two networks µ andμ is expressed below in the two equations.
Sorting is inefficient when: U (µ) < U (μ). The two inequalities governing pairwise stability and inefficiency has the following positive solution:
whereδ andδ are thresholds for respectively when network µ becomes inefficient and unstable when δ increases.
The example above demonstrates that sorting can be inefficient when there are network effects despite presence of supermodularity. The inefficiency stems from a novel source -the pairwise formation of links. The intuition is that under pairwise deviation the two agents do not internalize the total value created for other agents number of indirect links between a high and a low agent.
Note that the above example has a very close correspondence to Propositions 1.ii and 4.iii in Marti and Zenou (2016) -the only addition of their setup to our example is that they allow for a variation in the number of agents for each type.
We proceed with a generalization of the example above which holds for various structures of the subnetworks within types and for multiple types. As we proceed with our generalization we introduce two new concepts to convey the results.
Let the subset of agents who a link in µ be denoted N (µ) = {i ∈ N : ∃j s.t. ij ∈ µ}. A component,μ of network µ is a subnetwork (i.e.μ ⊆ µ) where for any agent i ∈ N (μ) it holds that: agent i is connected inμ to all other agents j ∈ N (μ), and; for all j ∈ N if ij ∈ µ then ij ∈μ. A perfectly sorted network is locally connected if there is one component for each type; the set of networks which are perfect sorted and locally connected is denoted M p−srt:conn .
Our next result is to extend the above example to a very general class of sorted networks.
The theorem below is for the case of hyperbolic decay but an alternative version under constant decay can be found in Appendix C in Theorem 2.
Theorem 1. Suppose there is supermodularity, hyperbolic decay, a non-singular degree quota and type self-sufficiency then:
whereM = M p−srt:conn ∩ M no−slack and threshold boundsδ,δ are defined as: A visualization of how the thresholds of externalities depend on population size and strength of complementarity is found in Figure 2 . The upper part of the figure keeps the population size fixed while lower ones keep the complementarity strength fixed. In the upper part it is evident that the connection thresholds both approximately follow power-laws in the number of agents.
The remainder of this subsection will sketch a policy intervention that can mitigate the problem of suboptimal sorting by improving welfare through encouraging connection. These interventions can be seen more generally as a design problem where the policy maker intervenes to induce a network that produces higher welfare. The tool that the policy maker employs is providing incentives to agents for forming specific links. Define a link-contingent contract as a non-negative transfer C ij to i for linking with another agent j. Denote the vector of link-contingent contract as C.
Definition 4. Let a networkμ be implementable from µ, τ given C if there exist a sequence of tuples (µ 0 , τ 0 ), .., (µ l , τ l ) where µ 0 = µ, µ l =μ and τ l = τ such that: for q = 1, .., l from µ q−1 to µ q is a feasible pairwise move which increases the pair's net-utility most given C, and;μ is pairwise stable given τ q and C. Proposition 2. Suppose that conditions for suboptimal sorting from Theorem 1 are valid and there are two types then a policy maker can implement a welfare improving network when δ ∈ (δ,δ) from a sorted network µ ∈M .
Note that the individual compensation for paid to agents for connecting to others may not be equal. In particular the pay may also depend on the types. This is the case when there is both supermodularity and monotonicity in Z then agents may receive compensation increasing their type. This would be the case in a sorted suboptimal network with no transfers where components have same number of agents and are isomorphic to another.
Large population We finalize this section by investigating what pattern of linking is exhibited
when the set of agents becomes asymptotic infinite. In this large matching market we examine asymptotic perfect sorting, i.e. when measured share of links to same type agents converges to one:
Definition 5. Let asymptotic perfect sorting hold for a sequence of networks setsM n if for any network µ ∈M n where n → ∞ it holds that |{ij ∈ µ :
Define asymptotic independence as δ < (κ − 1) −1 . For large matching markets the sufficient conditions for asymptotic perfect sorting to emerge in strongly stable networks are:
If there is supermodularity, a degree quota and constant decay with asymptotic independence then there is asymptotic perfect sorting for strongly stable networks.
The result above demonstrates that the availability of many agents for linking induces perfect sorting in strongly stable networks. This is the same prediction as the conclusion of Becker (1973) for the marriage market model but holds in the presence of externalities with constant decay. Note that the result relies on efficiency requiring perfect sorting and using this to infer properties of strong stability. However, we may interpret it differently, there is no loss of sorting when there are many agents.
Network structure
In this section we examine the structure of stable networks when measured by specific measures of network centrality such as the degree (i.e. number of links). The important restriction on link value in this context is monotonicity in type:
Definition 6. The link value has monotonicity if ∂ ∂x Z(x, y) > 0.
In constrast with the previous section here we model costs with an explicit cost function. The cost function for each agent is c : N 0 → R which is positive, strictly increasing and strictly convex in degree (i.e. number of links), k i .
No externalities
We begin with a setting where there are no externalities. The relevant measure of centrality without externalities are agents' number of links, i.e. degree. This measure is commonly used in applied in research on networks.
We start with the following question: what is the relation between network measures of centrality and type? The short answer is that type and connectivity go hand in hand: higher type implies (weakly) higher centrality. We call this degree monotonicity:
Definition 7. A set of networks M has degree monotonicity in type if:
Proposition 4. Suppose there are no externalities and monotonicity in link value then the set of pairwise stable networks has degree monotonicity.
The intuition behind the above result is that the marginal benefits for forming an additional link is strictly increasing in type when the link value is monotonic. Thus an agent with higher type has an increased incentive to form links jointly with other agents.
We turn to investigating whether or not more gregarious agents (agents with many partners), tend to associate with agents who are as gregarious as themselves? That is, is there sorting in degree. The simple answer is yes, under certain circumstances as elaborated below.
We build our intuition on two established results: firstly, there is a positive relationship between higher talent and (weakly) more partners (Proposition 4), and; secondly, partners are chosen assortative in talent (Proposition 1). By combining these two claims it can be shown there will also be degree assortativity. Although the intuition of combining the two previous results is straightforward additional structure needs to be imposed to show the result. Let complete heterogeneity be satisfied if for every agent has a unique level of talent, i.e. n = |X|.
Our concept of degree sorting is defined analogously to sorting in type. That is, every agent with strictly higher degree must have partners which weakly dominate in degree when compared partner-by-partner with the partners of agent with lower degree:
Definition 8. A network µ has sorting in degree when:
where K(t) as the vector of degrees for agents in coalition t ordered descending.
Proposition 5. If there are supermodularity, monotonicity in link value as well as complete heterogeneity but no externalities then every pairwise stable network has sorting in degree.
The above result is identical to Proposition 1 with the exception that the assortative property in this result is degree and this result has an added requirement. The emergence of this assortative pattern is not only a theoretical curiosity -this pattern is an underlying property observed across various empirical social networks, see the literature review.
The feature emerging degree assortativity in Proposition 5 is relevant as it indicates that positive degree assortativity may indicate people sort themselves according to talent.
When we move to a setting of externalities our pattern of sorting by degree does not hold in general. The reason is that either sorting by talent or monotonic degree may fail. This is captured by the follows from Corollary 1 in the next section as it shows both sorting in type and monotonic centrality may fail.
Externalities
We proceed by exploring the case of network externalities. We limit the examination to the relation between type and centrality, not neighbors' centrality.
We generalize the pattern of monotonic centrality in talent. However, in order to gain generality the restrictions on the link value Z(·) and a stricter equilibrium concept. We define monotonicity of δ-decay centrality by replacing the measure in the definition of degree monotonicity.
Also define no modularity when
Proposition 6. Suppose there are externalities as well as monotonicity and no modularity then the set of strongly stable networks has δ-decay monotonicity.
The result above emerges from the fact that there are only monotone and independent effects of more talent (due to the absence of modularity). The independence of effects entails that the link value can be split into a part for each partner, Z(x,x) =Ẑ(x) +Ẑ(x). It is possible to show that a given agent i's total contributions to the network is the product betweenẐ(x i ) and the sum of network weights. Under these circumstances monotonicity implies that more talented agents must have higher measure of network weights or else efficiency implied by strong stability is violated.
We conclude our analysis of monotonic centrality by pointing to the limitations of our results.
When no modularity is violated for instance then Proposition 6 may not hold, see Example 3
found in Appendix B.5. Likewise by relaxing strong stability in Proposition 6 to pairwise stability it follows that monotonic centrality also fails. This is seen from Example 2 and Corollary 1 in the next section.
Limits to sorting and centrality monotonicity
The previous two sections derive patterns for sorting and network centrality which we readdress here. We show the failure of those patterns is possible despite fulfilling some of the conditions that are sufficient in the previous sections: monotone and supermodular link value. We focus on a generic network where the agent with least type is in the center:
Definition 9. A star, µ, is a network where some agent called the center of µ and each other agent has only one single link is this a link to the center.
Definition 10. A star is low value sponsored when its center has the minimal type.
When there is monotonicity a low value sponsored star lacks efficiency. The lack of inefficiency stems from the fact that under monotonicity substituting a high-value agent to become the center will increase the value of the network. The following example demonstrates that the low value sponsored star can be stable under monotonicity and thus also inefficient:
Example 2. Let there be three agents where agents 1,2 are high types while agent 3 is low type.
Suppose additionally there is weak supermodularity, strict monotonicity and and convex costs.
Moreover network externalities have either constant or hyperbolic decay.
Let network µ be the low value sponsored star, i.e. µ = {13, 23}. Network µ is inefficient as µ = {12, 13} provides strictly higher aggregate utility as for δ ∈ [0, 1):
We show that µ is pairwise stable for certain transfers. We begin with conditions for when deviating is unprofitable when only are deleted links (no links formed). Cutting all links corresponds to an outside option with net-utility of zero -this is Inequality 4. Another option is agent 3 deleting one link and getting net value of the remaining link -see Inequality 5:
It remains to be shown the condition that prevent any pairwise deviation by forming a link.
Only agent 1,2 can form a link. There are three options for forming link 12: deleting no links,
Figure 3: The above network depicts the limits of sorting and monotonic centrality from Example 2. The low value agent (i=3) is excessively central which is inefficient. Moreover there is insufficient sorting as the high value agents (i=1,2) are not linked.
deleting one link or deleting all -captured by respectively Inequality 6, 7 and 8:
We conclude the example by indicating when the above conditions are satisfied. From Lemma 3 in Appendix B.5 the sufficient conditions for Inequality (4)- (8) to be satisfied are, linear costs (c of forming a link) and δ being sufficiently large as well as,
The reason why the low value sponsored star is stable in Example 2 is that agents fail to coordinate on displacing the low value agent with a high value agent as center. The failure arises despite having the potential to make everyone better off.
The intuition from Example 2 can extended to a more general result -low value sponsored stars may be stable even for many agents. This failure is expressed in the following result: 18 Corollary 1. If there are externalities, monotonicity, supermodularity and a cost function then the low value sponsored star is inefficient and can be pairwise stable.
The above result can be seen as an analogy to the results Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) . In their work on markets of consumers and sellers under consumer externalities a loss productive company may become the main supplier despite this being inefficient. This is similar to this result, the agents are locked in to an inefficient star despite this being inefficient.
This can be applied to understand how decentralized organizations may fail to promote the best candidate to become the leader but rather choose the incumbent.
As alluded to previously the above corollary can also be interpreted in terms of its implications for networks:
Corollary 2. When there are externalities then under pairwise stability: sorting in type may fail; monotonic degree centrality and δ-decay centrality may fail.
The corollary above demonstrates that despite meeting the conditions of Becker (1973) these conditions are not sufficient for sorting in social networks with externalities.
Concluding discussion
Our analysis is based on strict assumptions which we discuss in this final section. We avoid discussing sorting under search as there is a large literature e.g. Shimer and Smith (2000) . 18 The proof follows from the auxiliary results in Lemma 4 and 5 from Appendix B.5.
One severe caveat with our analysis, and stable networks in general, is that these networks may not exist. The classic example is the room-mate problem, cf. Gale and Shapley (1962) .
Furthermore, the gross substitutes conditions from Kelso and Crawford (1982) which ensures existence of stable matchings in related settings are not satisfied in our setting with externalities. 19 Neverthless, the scope in lack of existence may not be excessive. We can derive the cost of stability (the necessary payments to induce stability) from Bachrach et al. (2009) .
There is also a number of restrictive assumptions on payoff. The most crucial assumption are payoff separability and fixed structure of externalities. However, the results should be robust, for instance to introduction of utility from triads etc. which is common in the economic literature on networks. Another critical assumptions is supermodularity and monotonicity along with perfect transferability. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, these two assumptions can be replaced by monotonicity in individual link value and perfect non-transferability, which is also in line with some research on peer effects. 20 Finally although our model did not include a measure of effort this can incorporated by rewriting the setup as in Baccara and Yariv (2013) .
Finally it is important to note that the derivation of Proposition 3 and 6 rely on efficiency being a necessary condition for strong stability to hold. Although efficiency is a unique property for strong stability (and does not hold for weaker concepts) then strong stability should be seen as a refinement with desirable properties which makes it more likely when it exists. 21 Lemma 1. In the absence of network externalities then the set of strongly stable networks is equivalent to the set of pairwise stable networks, i.e., M to prove the claim. This claim is shown using similar to arguments to Klaus and Walzl (2009)'s Theorem 3.i.
Let µ with associated contracts τ be a network which is blocked by a coalition. It will be shown that for every coalition t ∈ T that blocks, within the coalition there is a subset of no more than two members that also wishes to block the network. Letμ be the alternative network that the blocking coalitions implements through a feasible coalition move and τ be the transfers associated withμ.
It is always possible to partition the set of deleted links µ\μ into two: (i) a subset denoted µ where for each link ij that can be deleted where one of the two partners can benefit, i.e. it holds that either
denotedμ where for each link ij neither of the previous two inequalities are satisfied.
Suppose that the first partition is non-empty, i.e.μ = ∅. However, as deleting links can be done by a single agent on its own then the move only takes needs the coalition of that agent to delete the link. Thus any part of a coalitional move that only involves profitably removing links can be performed in parts by a coalition with a single agent -therefore this move is also a pairwise block.
Thus it remains to be shown that the remaining part of coalitional move also can be performed as a pairwise block, i.e. when formingμ\µ and deletingμ. This part of the coalitional move must entail forming links as no links can be deleted profitably. The set of formed linksμ\µ can be partitioned into a number of |μ\µ| feasible submoves of adding a single link while deleting links by each of the agents i and j who form a link. The feasibility for each of the partitioned moves is always true when there is a cost function as moves are unrestricted. It is now argued that each of the partitioned moves are feasible when there is a degree quota. If the network µ ∪ ij is feasible then the move of simply adding the link is feasible. If µ ∪ ij is not feasible, then agents i and j can delete at most one link each and if both µ andμ are feasible then this also feasible as the degree quota is kept.
For the coalitional move toμ it must be that at least at least one link among the implemented linksμ\µ has a strictly positive value that exceeds the loss from deleting at most one link for each of two agents forming the link. This follows as it is known that deleting one or more links cannot add any value and thus must have weakly negative value and that by definition the total value to the blocking coalition must be positive. As every one of the partitioned moves is feasible, it follows that for every coalitional move there are two agents who can form link while potentially destroying current links and both be better off. In other words, for every coalition that blocks, there is a pairwise coalition that blocks.
Fact 1. For every κ, n such that n > κ and n · κ is even there exists a network µ n,κ where all agents have exactly κ neighbors. Moreover, if κ ≥ 2 then µ n,κ is connected.
Proof. Suppose n is even. Let % be the modulus operator. We can construct the following networks.
Letting µ n,κ =μ n,κ is sufficient for n is even. When n is odd we know that κ is even and thus we can use the following amended procedure instead:
We now show that if κ ≥ 2 it follows thatμ n,κ is connected. Assume that n is even and suppose κ ≤ n 2 ; for any i ∈ N : i < n 2 where i = i + 1 and let j = n 2 + i + 1 where ij, i j ∈μ n,κ ; thus for all i, i ∈ {1, .., n 2 } it holds that p ii (μ n,κ ) < ∞. In addition, as for any i ∈ N : i ≤ n 2 , j = n 2 + i it holds that ij ∈μ n,κ it follows thatμ n,κ is connected. If instead κ > n 2 then by construction ii ∈μ n,κ if either max(i, i ) ≤ n 2 or min(i, i ) > n 2 as ii / ∈μ n,n−κ−1 . Moreover, for i ∈ N : i < n 2 and j = n 2 + (i + κ) % n 2 it holds that ij / ∈μ n,n−κ−1 ; thus ij ∈μ n,κ . Thereforeμ n,κ must be connected.
Assume instead that n is odd. By the above argument there are at least two connected subnetworks consisting of agents in ∪ ι{1,.., κ 2 } {ι, ι n,κ (ι)} and agents who are connected through agent, n, i.e. N \(∪ ι{1,.., Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Let q be the lowest index for which the condition fail: for all l < q it holds that X (ν i (µ)/{j}) l ≥ X (ν j (µ)/{i}) l+l * where l * = max(k j (µ) − k i (µ), 0). Thus there are two agents i , j such that:
Recall k * = min(k i (µ), k j (µ)). The argument why there must exist an agent i in ν j (µ) but not in (ν j (µ) ∪ {j}) is that |{ι ∈ ν i (µ) : x ι < x j }| > |{ι ∈ ν j (µ) : x ι < x j }|. This follows as by construction it holds that |{ι ∈ ν i (µ) : x ι < x j }| = k * − q + 1 and |{ι ∈ ν j (µ) :
The agents are such that x i > x j , x i < x j as well as ij , ji / ∈ µ. However, this fact implies that there is a violation of strong stability: agents i, i , j, j can deviate by destroying {ij, i j } and forming {ij , i j} and thus increase payoffs due to supermodularity (cf. Equation 2). From
Lemma 1 it follows that pairwise stability is also violated if strong stability is violated.
B.2 Sorting: externalities -finite population
Lemma 2. Suppose that min x∈X n x > κ, κ ≥ 2; if ∃i ∈ N : i) |{i ∈ ν i (µ) :
Suppose that for i ∈ N the conditions i)-iv) are met but the lemma is not true. If i ∈ N x and ii / ∈ µ then there must exist some i ∈ N x such that i i ∈ µ and i / ∈ ν i (µ) as
then the proof is terminated so we must assume p i i (µ\{i i }) = ∞.
As p i i (µ\{i i }) = ∞ then there must exist two components in µ, µ , µ ⊆ µ\({ι l ι l }, where in each component µ or µ there are at least κ+1 agents of type x (as for any ι ∈ (ν i (µ)∪ν i (µ)) it holds that x ι = x). Moreover, i can at most be connected to one of i , i in µ\({i i } as otherwise i , i would be connected in µ\{i i }. Denote the component {µ , µ } where i is part of asμ and defineÑ = {ι ∈ N x \ν i (µ) : ∃ι ∈ N : ιι ∈μ}.
Let ι 0 ∈ arg max ι∈i ,i p ιi and iteratively ι l ∈ ν ι l−1 (µ), l ∈ N. Moreover, there must be only a unique path in µ\{i i } between any two agents ι, ι ∈Ñ as otherwise iι, iι / ∈ µ but p ιι (μ\{i i }) < ∞ -in this case we could instead denote i = ι and i = ι . However, the single unique path entails that at level l or below there are l q=0 (κ−1) q agents; thus n x ≥ l q=0 (κ−1) q . Let l be the minimal q such that ∀ ∈ ι ∈Ñ : p iι ≤ q; as n x is finite such a q must exist. In addition, as there is a unique path between agents in µ then any agent ι ∈Ñ : p ιι 0 = l has only one link, and thus its degree is less than κ (as κ ≥ 2). This violates the condition that all i ∈ N where x i = x has k i = κ.
Theorem 1: Suppose there is supermodularity, hyperbolic decay, a non-singular degree quota and type self-sufficiency then:
whereM = M p−srt:conn ∩ M no−slack and threshold boundsδ,δ are defined as:
Proof. We begin showing properties (i) and (ii). Suppose µ ∈ M p−srt:conn ∩ M no−slack -we will demonstrate there are thresholds on δ such that µ pairwise stability and efficiency. We're only interested in the minimal thresholds such that for all values of externalities below those then stability and efficiency holds. Thus it is sufficient to evaluate the deviations from the network where the net gains are highest.
The losses from breaking a link ij ∈ µ can be shown to have bounded from below such that:
(i.e. any i, i of type x are linked). This entails that p ii (µ\{ii }) = 2 and thus p ii (µ\{ii }) < ∞.
Suppose instead that n x < κ + 1, x ∈ X then by Lemma 2 there exists some i, j, both of type
Thus when evaluating losses at the threshold we can assume that when deleting some link ij that i, j are connected in µ\{ij}. Although the length of the shortest paths may increase, there will still be an indirect connection and therefore no loss of utility for anyone but the two agents who lose their link. Therefore we assume throughout that when evaluating thresholds if ii is deleted in M p−srt:conn ∩ M no−slack then only agents i, i , who must be of same type, will each lose (1 − δ) · z(x, x) while no other agents of incur a loss.
Suppose two agents i, j of distinct types respectively x,x deviate by forming a link and delete a link each from µ. The total loss for i and j for deleting a link each is:
The benefits gained for agent i for establishing a link to j is [1
Thus the total benefits gained for i and j from pairwise deviation can be bounded as follows.
.
We can derive the threshold for pairwise stability:
Thus we can establish a lower bound forδ (i.e. the upper bound in δ for pairwise stability of µ) by taking the minimum of left-hand-side in Equation 9; thus it follows that:δ ≥ min x,x∈X
We can do a similar procedure for findingδ for when the aggregate gains of establishing links across types is zero. We will evaluate the bridged networkμ = µ ∪ {ij, i j }\{ii , jj } where
The gains from connecting are two links of value Z(x,x) as well as n x · n x − 2 indirect connections (between all agents of type x andx) of value Z(x,x) · δ. It follows that the total gains in benefits are
The threshold δ can be found from finding when gains equal losses:
It follows that the thresholdδ (which is such that every δ above implies there exists an efficient deviation from µ) must be at least the minimum of left-hand-side in Equation 10 over possible types, i.e. it must hold thatδ ≤ min x,x∈X
. This terminates the proof for part (i) of the theorem.
We move on to property (iii) of the proof where we establish characterization of pairwise stable networks. We need to show thatM = M
thus it remains to show: that M p−stb δ≤δ ⊆M . As |X| = 2 it holds that X = {x, x}. Define Υ:
As δ <δ it follows from Equation 9 that:
Suppose µ / ∈ M p−sort . Define a sequence of agent pairs, i 0 j 0 , i 1 j 1 , ... as follows. Let agents i 0 , j 0 ∈ N be such that x i = x j and ij ∈ µ; such i 0 , j 0 must exist as µ / ∈ M p−sort . Without loss of generality let x i 0 = x and x j 0 =x where x,x ∈ X, and assume that:
The above inequality must hold for either type x orx as we substitute labels for i, j as well as x,x due to Υ > 0.
Let l ∈ N. It is assumed that for any q < l : x iq = x, x jq =x . Also assume an associated set collection of links, µ l−1 ⊂ µ, and let the set be defined as µ l−1 = ∪ l−1 q=0 {i q j q } such that for each q < l: i q i q−1 / ∈ µ if q is odd and j q j q−1 / ∈ µ if q is even. At step q ∈ N let ι q = i q−1 if q is even else denote ι q = j l−1 . Also let η q ∈ {i q−1 , j q−1 } : η q = ι q . This entails that ι 1 = i 0 and η 1 = j 0 .
Define x q = x,x q =x if q is even else vice versa. Also let N q = {ι ∈ N :
Suppose that at every q ∈ N : q < l it holds that ι q / ∈ ν ιq (µ), x ι l = x l and let η l ∈ ν ι l (µ).
Finally also define at every q < l the move ∆µ q = µ ∪ {ι q ι q }\{ι q η q , ι q η q } and let:
Note that ∆µ q = {i q i q−1 } ∪ ∆μ q if q is even and ∆µ q = {j q j q−1 } ∪ ∆μ q if q is even; ∆μ q = µ ∪ \{i q−1 j q−1 , i q j q }. By inserting i, j for ι, η we yield the following expression:
Assume that for every q ∈ N where q < l:
Suppose Equation 16 is satisfied. It follows that net gains of benefits for ι q from deleting the link with η q while forming a link together with ι q can be bounded: the upper bound on losses is when a connection is lost to all agents of typex q : [1 + (n q − 1) · δ] · z(x q , x q ); the lower bound on gains is (1 − δ) · z(x q ,x q ) as the distance between ι q ι q is shortened to 1.
Suppose Equations 16 and 17 -we can demonstrate that Equation 17 also where we replace ι q with ι q . If p ιqι q (µ) < ∞ then as it also holds that p ιqι q (∆µ q ) < ∞ it follows that p ι q ι q (µ) < ∞ and p ι q ι q (∆µ q ) = ∞ which violates Equation 17. Thus it must be that p ιqι q (µ) = ∞. Suppose
be that p η q ι q (µ) < ∞ and thus p ι q ι q (µ) < ∞ which implies that p ιqι q (µ) = ∞. However, this is a
Analogue to the derivation of Inequality 18 the net gains are bounded when Equations 16 and 17 are satisfied:
One implication of Inequalities 12 and 20 if l > 1:
Another implication of Inequality 20 is that:
In order for ∆µ q not to be a profitable pairwise deviation it must hold that:
We can rewrite the above inequality using that ι q−1 = η q , η q−1 = ι q and thus τ ι q−1 η q−1 = τ ηqιq .
We also substitute in Equation 13 and assume the above inequality holds for any q < l:
As τ η l ι l = τ ι l−1 η l−1 and −τ ι l η l = τ η l ι l it follows that using Equation 15:
Define the set of partners for ι l :
A property ofN l is thatN l = ∅; this follows as minx ∈X nx ≥ κ + 1. Let ι l ∈N l which implies that Equation 16 holds.
Suppose that k ι l (µ) < κ. As Equation 16 holds it follows that
and thus u ι q (µ ∪ {ι q ι q }\{ι q η q }) > 0.
We can also derive utility bounds using Inequality 24 along with Inequalities 11, 21:
thus ι l , ι l can profitably from deviate pairwise. Thus it must be that k ι l (µ) = κ.
Suppose there exists
follows that that utility for ι l is:
And utility for ι l can bounded be as follows using Inequality 18 for u ι l (∆μ l ) − u ι l (µ) as Equation 16 holds :
The above inequalities entails that ι l , ι l can deviate profitably pairwise; this is a violation of pairwise stability and thus cannot be true. Thus there exists no
Suppose that ∀ι l ∈ N l : η l ∈ ν ι l (µ\µ l−1 ) :
. By Lemma 2 it follows there exists ι l , ι l ∈ N l \ν i (µ) such that p ι l ι l (µ\{ι l ι l }) < ∞, ι l ι l ∈ µ and τ ι l ι l ≤ 0 which by the arguments above cannot be true.
Therefore there has to exist some ι l ∈ N l for which there is an agent η l ∈ ν ι l (µ\µ l−1 ) where it holds that x η l = x l .
A duplicate occurs if i l−1 , j l−1 ∈ µ l−2 . That is for some l < l it holds that either
If l − l is odd, then τ ι l −1 η l −1 = −τ ι l−1 η l−1 and therefore we can reduce the Inequality 23:
thus there must be a feasible pairwise deviation for ι q , ι q where
If l −l is even then τ ι l−1 η l−1 = τ ι l −1 η l −1 ; thus Inequality 23 for no pairwise deviation becomes:
q=l ∆U q . This can in turn be rewritten as follows:
Using that ι q = η q−1 and η l −1 = η l−1 we get: 0 ≥ l−1 q=l ∆Û q . Recall that for all q ∈ N : q < l it holds that ∆Û q ≥ Υ where Υ > 0. Thus there must be a feasible pairwise deviation.
Due to ι l , η l = η l+1 , ι l+1 it follows that it cannot be that ι l η l ∈ µ l−1 as otherwise i l j l ∈ µ l−1 . This entails ι l ∈ N l : ∃η l ∈ ν ι l (µ l−1 ). Therefore we can assume ∀ι l ∈ N l : η l ∈ ν ι l (µ l−1 ) and
Suppose that Equation 17 is violated for any ι l ∈N l . This is equivalent to it holds for any
As Equation 17 must hold for any ι l ∈N l we can reproduce the argument iteratively and thus
(∆µ l ) = ∞. However, as n < ∞ it follows that there for some q ∈ N that
l ; for any η l ∈ ν ι l (µ) there is no ι l ∈ N l such that p ι l ι l (µ) = ∞. This contradicts that Equation 17 is violated for agent ι l = ι (q) l . Suppose µ / ∈ M no−surpl. . This would entail that ∃i ∈ N : k i (µ) < κ. As n x > κ there has to ∃i ∈ N :
thus ii can be formed profitably pairwise. Moreover, as k i (µ) = κ it follows that ∃i ∈ ν i :
ii / ∈ µ, x i = x i . By Lemma 2 it follows there exists ι, ι ∈Ñ \ν i (µ) such that p ιι (µ\{ιι }) < ∞, ιι ∈ µ and τ ιι ≤ 0. This entails that
. Thus i, ι can deviate profitably pairwise which contradicts pairwise Nash stability. Therefore it must be that µ ∈ M no−surpl.
Suppose µ / ∈ M p−sort+conn . As µ ∈ M p−sort ∩ M no−surpl. there exist i, i , j, j ∈ N : x i = x i = x j = x j and ij, i j ∈ µ and p ii (µ) = ∞. Without loss of generality we assume that τ ij , τ i j ≤ 0 (otherwise we could simply switch identities some i's and j's). This entails:
Also we have that: Finally property (iv) follows as Fact 1 can be applied to the subset of agents associated with each type as ∀x ∈ X : n x > κ and κ · n x ∈ 2N.
Proposition 2: Suppose that conditions for suboptimal sorting from Theorem 1 are valid and there are two types then a policy maker can implement a welfare improving network when δ ∈ (δ,δ) from a sorted network µ ∈M .
Proof. Let µ ∈M and δ ∈ (δ,δ). By construction there exists a networkμ which has higher aggregate utility. Let the two pairs of agents ii , jj be agents such thatμ = µ ∪ {ij, i j }\{ii , jj } and x i = x i = x and x j = x j = x. Specify a link-contingent contract to i, j whereμ = µ ∪ {ij}\{ii , jj } such that:
∀ιι ∈ {ij, i j } :
∀ιι / ∈ {ij, ji, i j , j i } :
By Theorem 1 we know that µ is pairwise stable. Pairwise stability implies that
as deviation is not profitable. Using this fact together with Inequality 27 it follows that:
The above inequality entails agents i, j are a blocking coalition that can gain by deviating tô µ; this blocking move is also the only profitable move for i, j due to pairwise stability of µ and Equation 28.
In networkμ agents i , j have an incentive to form a link with one another as both have surplus link capacity (i.e. degree below the quota) and forming a link is profitable from Inequality 27.
Moreover, we show in the following that this move is the one that ensures the highest aggregate net benefits to i , j .
We begin with showing that linking across types to other agents of type x,x is not profitable.
Suppose i links across types to another agent j ∈ {ι = j : x ι = x j }. First, note the pairwise deviation from µ to form i j is unprofitable (due to pairwise stability), thus it less profitable than forming i j from µ (which is profitable by Inequality 27). Second, the net-increase in value of the pairwise deviation to form i j over i j increases from µ toμ -this is true as j loses the link with i from µ while j has an unchanged number -thus j will have a weakly lower opportunity cost of deleting links inμ. The same argument can be applied to j for i ∈ {ι = i :
We turn to showing that linking to other agents of same type (staying sorted) is not more profitable as well. Suppose i and j link to same types as themselves respectively, i.e. i ∈ {ι = i : x ι = x i } and j ∈ {ι = j : x ι = x j }. Suppose ii ∈ µ then no feasible pairwise moves to same type can exist inμ as the move can only involve deleting links; same is true if jj ∈ µ. Thus instead we use ii , jj / ∈ µ. It must be that any pairwise deviation forming either ii or jj from µ is unprofitable (as µ is pairwise stable); this implies that for any ι ∈ ν i (μ) and ι ∈ ν j (μ) it holds that:
The above inequality implies together with Inequalities 29 and 30 that the total gains for i and j exceeds the total value that could be generated from alternative deviations. Thus there are two pairwise moves from µ toμ and fromμ toμ which both provide strictly higher utility to the deviating agents.
Pairwise stability follows from three arguments. First, all deviations among agents where only links inμ ∩ µ are deleted will provide at most the same value inμ that the deviations did in µ -this follows as these agents all have the same links and inμ all agents are connected inμ and thus only direct links matter. This upper limit too gains from deviations implies none of these moves can be profitable as they were unprofitable form µ. Second, deviations that involve deletion of links inμ\µ are shown above to provide strictly higher value than any other deviations -thus deviating fromμ must also provide strictly lower value.
B.3 Sorting: externalities -infinite population
Proposition 3: If there is supermodularity, a degree quota and constant decay with asymptotic independence then there is asymptotic perfect sorting for strongly stable networks.
Proof. Under asymptotic independence it follows that average per agent utility for type x under asymptotic perfect sorting converges to (using a geometric series):
Suppose that for two types, x,x there is not perfect sorting, and in particular there is some mixing between them, i.e. ω xx > 0; the average per agent utility is:
Each agent will almost surely have κ links as it is assumed that each link adds positive value and there are asymptotic infinite agents (only a finite number can then not fulfill the degree quota).
As we have a finite set of types we can assume then for large populations there is a subset of types,X ⊆ X, where for every type x ∈X it holds that there is an asymptotic strictly positive share of the total number of agents of that type, i.e., lim n→∞ (|{i ∈ N n } x i =x |/n) > 0. If there is only one such type, i.e. |X| = 1, then asymptotic perfect sorting follows by assumption as the asymptotic number of links is κ.
For any two types x,x ∈X which are mixing their average utility is:
As there is supermodularity it follows that Z(x, x) + Z(x,x) − 2Z(x,x) > 0 and thus mixing must decrease utility. The same argument can be applied by mixing between multiple types.
B.4 Network structure
Proposition 4: Suppose there is monotonicity and no externalities in link value then the set of pairwise stable networks has degree monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false; that is, for some pairwise stable network µ ∈ M p−stb it holds for two agents i and j that
there is another agent who is in ν j (µ) but not in ν i (µ) which entails that ν j (µ)\(ν i (µ) ∪ {i}) = ∅.
From the cost technologies (either convex or a degree quota) it must be that
as k i (µ) < k j (µ). Combining the restriction on benefits it follows that the value created by forming ij and deleting jj can be restricted:
As the move to (µ ∪ ij )\{jj } is feasible (and respects the degree quota if there is one), it follows that strong stability is violated as it implies that µ is not efficient. From Lemma 1 it follows that pairwise stability is also violated if the claim is false.
Proposition 5: If there are supermodularity, monotonicity in link value as well as complete heterogeneity but no externalities then every pairwise stable network has sorting in degree.
Proof. As there are no externalities, supermodularity and monotonicity in link value then Proposition 1 and 4 must hold. In addition, as agents i and j are distinct under complete heterogeneity then either x i > x j or x i > x i . As k i (µ) ≥ k j (µ) it must be that x i > x i as the converse would violate Proposition 4.
From Proposition 1 it is known that if there are two agents such that x i > x i then this
This inequality entails there are exactly two possible cases for any index l = 1, ..., k j (µ). The first case is that X (ν i (µ)/{j}) l = X (ν j (µ)/{i}) l . In this case K(ν i (µ)/{i}) l = K(ν j (µ)/{i}) l as the agent linked to i and j must be the same due to complete heterogeneity. Else in the other case where
Proposition 6: Suppose there are externalities as well as monotonicity and no modularity then the set of strongly stable networks has δ-decay monotonicity.
Proof. The no modularity condition implies that individual link value is independent of own talent and thus separable for anyx ∈ X: Z(x,x) =Z(x) +Z(x) whereZ is the contribution to the link value for a given level of talent. Thus we can rewrite Equation 1:
Due to monotonicity in link value it also holds that
This entails that a necessary condition for the sum of utilities to be maximal by some network µ is that for any two agents i , j such that
The necessity is demonstrated in the following.
Denote an alternative networkμ where i and j have switched positions: if i and j are not linked in µ then let ν i (μ) = ν i (µ) and ν i (μ) = ν i (µ); else if i and j are linked in µ then let
A deviation from µ toμ is possible for the grand coalition. We will show that the alternative networkμ will generate higher aggregate utility which violates efficiency of µ and thus also violates strong stability. Starting with costs there are two cases of cost technology: when there is quota in links then a deviation to the alternative network µ is consistent with the degree quota 22 and has unchanged costs; when there are convex costs then the move will have no change in aggregate costs as the sum of costs for agents i and j is unchanged. However, the benefits will be higher underμ, using that i and i switch neighborhoods
B.5 Limits to sorting and monotonic centrality
Example 3. This example shows how monotonic δ-decay centrality can fail when there is supermodularity. The stability concept is strong stability.
Suppose there are seven agents -three of high type (1-3) and four of low type (4-7). There is supermodularity; a degree quota of two, and; a level of network externalities δ. Consider the segregated network µ = {12, 23, 31}∪{45, 56, 67, 74}, and the connected networkμ = {12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 67, 71}.
If the inequality below holds with ">" then µ is an efficient network; if "<" thenμ is an efficient network.
When Inequality 31 holds with ">" then µ is furthermore strongly stable when for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N ; i = j it holds that there are no transfers between them, i.e. τ ij = 0. In the
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {5, 6, 7}. Note that Inequality 31 holds with ">" ifẐ > 1 + 2δ + 3δ 2 andẐ > 1 due to supermodularity.
Lemma 3. In Example 2 the sufficient conditions for existence of τ such that µ is stable are linear costs (c of forming a link) and δ being sufficiently high along with the two inequalities:
Proof. Linear cost entails that c(2) = 2c(1). Note that the total cost of establishing a link is 2c.
Throughout we assume symmetry such that s 1 = s 2 and τ 12 = 0 which implies τ 31 = τ 32 . To shorten notation let s i = s i (µ, τ ).
We begin with deriving the required transfers and net utility for the low type, i.e. agent 3, the relevant Inequalities are 4, 5, 8. The two inequalities (for i = 1, 2) in Inequality 5 can be rewritten using that τ 31 = τ 32 :
Thus Inequality 5 is irrelevant when τ 12 = τ 13 and Inequality 4 (s 3 ≥ 0) is satisfied.
By adding the two inequalities in Inequality 8 where i = 3 and j = 1, 2 together and using non-wastefulness (Σ i∈N s i (µ, τ ) = U (µ)) the following must hold for the net utility of agent 3:
We see that Inequality 33 is satisfied when Inequality 4 holds (s 3 ≥ 0). Note that the two inequalities in Inequality 8 where i = 3 and j = 1, 2 must still hold.
We now turn to derive to check relevant transfer and net utilities for agent 1 and 2. The relevant expressions are Inequalities 4, 6, 7 and 8. For large enough δ (i.e. δ → 1) then it always holds that Inequality 6 is satisfied; thus it suffices to check Inequalities 4, 7 and 8.
We use a similar procedure to see the implication on net utility of agent i ∈ {1, 2}. Let j = {1, 2}\{i}. By adding the two inequalities from Inequality 8 for the pair of 3, i and the pair i, j, together and using non-wastefulness (Σ i∈N s i (µ, τ ) = U (µ)) it must hold that:
For sufficiently large δ then Inequality 34 becomes irrelevant as in the limit of δ → 1 its requirement is min{s 1 , s 2 } ≥ −Z(x,x) which is always satisfied when min{s 1 , s 2 } ≥ 0. Note that it still remains to check all three conditions from Inequality 8 are valid.
In addition, it is possible to rewrite Inequality 7 in to Inequality 35. Note that Inequality 35 is a sufficient condition for Inequality 35 for both agent 1 and 2.
In the remainder of this proof we restrict that s 3 = 0 and thus τ 12 = τ 13 = z(x,x) −c. This restriction ensures the minimal requirements for the transfer and net utility for agent 3 are met (see Inequalities 4, 5, 8) . This restriction allows us to assess when the remaining requirements are satisfied for agents 1 and 2 given that the requirements for agent are minimally satisfied. When s 3 = 0 then Inequality 8 is satisfied if:
It is possible to further restrict sufficient conditions for when the remaining relevant inequalities are satisfied when s 1 = s 2 and s 3 = 0. Recall that it is necessary to check Inequalities 4, 7
and 8 for large enough δ. The sufficient condition for the inequalities is captured in Inequality 37
below. The elements in the set from which the maximal element is chosen derived from respectively: Inequality 4; Inequality 35 which implies Inequality 7 is satisfied; Inequality 8 for the pair 1,2; Inequality 36 which implies Inequality 8 for the pair 1,3 and the pair 2,3.
Using that s 3 = 0 it holds that s 1 + s 2 = s 1 + s 2 + s 3 . Combining non-wastefulness (Σ i∈N s i (µ, τ ) = U (µ)) with Inequality 37 we can derive the following four inequalities -each inequality correspond to an n'th element in the set from which the maximal element is chosen.
Of the above we see that Inequality 39 holds when δ is large enough while Inequality 41 always holds. Thus all the above inequalities can be satisfied for large enough δ when 2Z(x,x) + δZ(x,x) ≥ 4c and Z(x,x) >c.
In what follows we demonstrate two auxiliary results: Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. These two results imply Corollary 1 and 2. The first auxiliary lemma rely on Condition 1 below; this condition is a generalization of the conditions from Example 2.
Condition 1. Let µ = ∪ i∈1,..,n−1 {in}; transfers are restricted as follows:
along with the following three set of inequalities,
∀i, j ∈ N, i = j :
and finally the following two set of inequalities must hold for any two i, j ∈ (N \{n}), i = j:
Lemma 4. Suppose there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3), weak supermodularity and monotonicity, a cost function and an interval [δ,δ] where all inequalities from Condition 1 are satisfied, then for every δ ∈ [δ,δ] the low value sponsored star is pairwise stable.
Proof. The network µ be a low value sponsored star with agent n as center, i.e. µ = ∪ i∈1,..,n−1 {in}.
We show that µ is pairwise stable if the relevant conditions are met.
First we check for deviations from µ where an agent deletes all its links in µ. This move cannot be profitable when Inequality 43 is satisfied for all individuals. This implies for any agent but agent n it is not profitable to delete their single link in µ. Furthermore for agent n deleting any link is not profitable due to due to Inequality 44 being satisfied. This also implies that deleting any number of links for agent n is not beneficial as each is beneficial at the highest marginal cost.
Second network µ is robust to deviations where two agents delete all links and form a single link as any two agents can only gain less by such a move cf. Inequality 45.
Finally the network µ is robust to deviation where a link is formed by two agents of which one agent deletes its link to n but another agent keeps its link to agent n when Inequality 46 is satisfied. The network µ is robust to deviations where both agents keep their current link with agent n and form a new link together if Inequality 47 is satisfied.
Lemma 5. Sufficient conditions for a low value sponsored star, with agent n as center, to be stable are: linear linking costs; many agents; δ ∈ [1 − 2c /Z(x 1 , x 2 ), 1); transfers s.t. s n ≥ 0 and
Proof. The setting is as specified by Lemma 4 where costs are linear such that total costs are c(k) = k ·c. Note the total cost of establishing a link then is 2c as two agents are required. We use a procedure similar to the one for Lemma 3 to find the restrictions on net utility for agents.
We first investigate restrictions for agent n and then the remaining agents.
We examine the implication for the lower bound on net-utility for agent n from the n-1 inequalities for agent n with the other agents in Inequality 44 by summing over the inequalities:
Thus if the n − 1 conditions from Inequality 44 hold it is a sufficient condition for Inequality 43 also to hold for agent n; thus we only require that τ ni ≥c − z(x, x i ) for agent i = n.
We analogously examine the implication of the other n − 1 inequalities in Inequality 45 for agent n's lower bound on net-utility by summing and subtracting Equation 42:
The above inequality is less strict than Inequality 43 thus without implication on agent n.
We now investigate restrictions for other agents. By summing over Inequality 45 for agent i ∈ {1, .., n − 1} with other agents and subtracting Equation 42 we get:
Due to monotonicity it holds that we can bound link value for any i, j : Z(x,x) ≥ Z ij ≥ Z(x,x). A sufficient condition for the above inequality is:
For δ > 0 and sufficiently many agents (as n → ∞) then the above inequality is irrelevant as the right hand side is negative for i = n; thus Inequality 45 will not be binding a constraint.
In addition, for any two agents i, j = 1 it is possible to rewrite Inequality 46 in to the following (using that τ ij = 0 when i, j = n):
The maximum of Inequality 50 for agent i is:
The above inequality can be satisfied for all agents apart excluding agent n when:
We check validity of Inequality 51 using non-wastefulness in Equation 42:
For many agents it must be that (
as U (µ) is quadratic in size while the right hand side is linear. Thus s n ≥ 0 can be satisfied for large populations along with the conditions for other agents.
Finally we see that Inequality 47 is satisfied for all agents when:
C Supplementary appendix: Suboptimal sorting for constant decay
This appendix shows a how suboptimally sorted networks are also prevalent under constant decay.
It is split into two sub-appendices: sub-appendix C.1 which deals with demonstrating the results and sub-appendix C.2 which only contains auxiliary results.
C.1 Suboptimal sorting in local trees
We show sorting may be pairwise stable but suboptimal under constant decay for a subclass of networks. We begin by describing this subclass. Informally put, the relevant subclass of perfectly sorted networks where each subnetwork for a given type has a certain structure. The structure of each subnetwork is such that from the perspective of every agent (i.e. the ego-network) each subnetwork appears as a tree when disregarding the links of the agents furthest away. Note that a tree is network where every pair of agents are connected by a unique path. Thus these subnetworks are called local trees as they are not trees in a global sense but only when disregarding most distant agents.
The formal definition is as described below. The definition employs the network diameter which is the maximum distance between any two agents, i.e. r(µ) = sup i,j∈N p ij (µ).
Definition 11. A network µ is a local tree when each agent i has κ links where:
• for each other agent j = i at distance p ij (µ) ≤ r n,κ − 2 there are κ − 1 links between agent j and j such that j is one step further away, i.e. p ij (µ) = p ij (µ) − 1;
• the network diameter r(µ) = r n,κ , r n,κ = arg min
The structure of local trees entails that each agent has κ · (κ − 1) p−1 agents at distance p < r, where r = r n,κ . At distance p = r there are n − r−1 l=1 κ · (κ − 1) l−1 (all remaining agents). This structure implies that every agent's utility is maximized subject to the constraint of all agents having at most κ links; 23 a side effect is that utility before transfers is symmetric.
A necessary condition for local trees to exist is that there is no link surplus, i.e. degree quota is binding (∀i ∈ N : k i = κ). Note this binding condition is only possible when n · κ is even.
When a local tree network fulfills n = r l=1 κ · (κ − 1) l−1 then it is an exact local tree. See the next sub-appendix for an elaborate treatment of structure of exactly local trees. Two subclasses of exact local trees which are worth mentioning. The first is a network known as a cycle or a ring. In order to derive our results it is necessary to restrict ourselves to a subset of local trees.
The subset are those local trees where the deletion of links leads to equal losses to both of agents whose link is deleted; thus we refer to these local trees as having symmetric losses:
Definition 12. A local tree µ has symmetric losses when at every distance p = 1, .., r it holds
Denote the set of perfectly sorted networks where the subnetwork for each type is a local tree with symmetric losses as M p−srt:symm. loc−tree .
Whether or not symmetric losses is a generic property for all local trees is an open question.
However, in simulations that we perform it holds all network configurations which are local trees up to size n = 10 have symmetric losses (see result below and proof for exhibition of examples).
Moreover for size up to n = 16 it has been shown to hold for any networks examined in the simulation.
23 The maximization of utility follows from the observation that each agent has at most κ links, so at distance p there can be at most κ · (κ − 1) p−1 agents. 24 An example is {i1i2, i1i3, i1i4, i2i5, i2i6, i3i7, i3i8, i4i9, i4i10, i5i7, i5i9, i6i8, i6i10, i7i9 , i8i10} when n = 10, κ = 3.
A generalization of stable but suboptimal sorting under constant decay is expressed below.
While allowing for constant decay rather than hyperbolic it the set of networks are further restricted.
Theorem 2. Suppose there is supermodularity, a degree quota κ and each type has equal number of agents then
; whereM = M p−srt:symm. loc−tree and thresholdsδ,δ ∈ (0, 1) whereδ <δ Proof. We show properties (i) and (ii) together. Let µ be a network which is segregated into |X| components where each component is a local tree with n/|X| agents. Let there be no transfers between any agents.
As each subnetwork for a given type is a local tree it is stable against deviations by agents of the same type -this follows as local trees provides maximal possible benefits among feasible structures of the subnetwork for all agents in the subnetwork. Thus only two agents of different types may have a profitable deviation which is feasible.
Let ι, j be agents of respectively types x andx. These two agents can deviate by each deleting a link to ι and j respectively while jointly forming a link. The new network resulting from deletion is denotedμ = µ\{ιι , jj }. The move resulting from deletion and forming a link is denotedμ =μ ∪ {ιj}. An alternative network isμ, the type-bridged network of µ, where the links ιι , jj are removed while the links ιj, ι , j have been formed; thusμ =μ ∪ {ιj, ι j }.
Define the gross loss of benefits for i as u i (μ) − u i (µ) while the gross gains are u i (μ) − u i (μ).
There must exist a threshold of externalitiesδ ∈ (0, 1) where µ is no longer pairwise stable as cost of deviation monotonically decreases and approaches zero as δ → 1 while gains are monotonically increasing. The monotonicity of losses is a consequence of the fact that gross loss consists of shortest paths from µ, where ιι is included in the shortest path, which have longer length inμ and thus are discounted more. Therefore the gross loss is mitigated by a higher δ as the longer shortest paths are punished less. The monotonicity of gains follows as the gains consist of new shortest paths to agents of typex through ιj and j ι the value of these increases for higher δ.
Exploiting the that Fact 2 and 3 from Appendix C.2 hold for local trees it follows that for any other agent i of type x (i.e. i is in N \{ι, ι } and x i = x):
Aggregating for all agents this implies:
where r = r n,κ . The inequality above implies the following: if
It can also be argued that there must exist a threshold,δ, such that when δ =δ then U (μ) − U (µ) = 0 and thatδ <δ. This follows as U (μ) − U (µ) < 0 for δ = 0 and U (μ) − U (µ) > 0 when
This entails that for δ >δ thenμ provide higher aggregate payoff. Moreover we showed previously that for δ <δ then µ is pairwise (Nash) stable. Thus we have proven properties (i) and (ii).
For constant decay the thresholds governing when sorting is respectively suboptimal and stable, i.e.δ,δ, can be determined explicitly by solving polynomial equations for every deviation.
Moreover, for exact local trees there is a unique solution. In Figure 5 the two thresholds from Theorem 2,δ(Ẑ),δ(Ẑ). involved. This makes sense intuitively as the two agents forming the link will fail to account for an increasing number of indirect connections between the two groups. As the number of indirect connections increases at with the squared with total number of agents then larger populations will lead to larger gaps of inefficiency.
C.2 Local trees
This sub-appendix provides auxiliary results for deriving the generalization of suboptimal sorting.
We begin our focus on exact local trees and subsequently more generally in local tree networks, see Definition 11 in the previous sub-appendix.
We will examine a generic network µ which is perfectly sorted and assume that the subset of links for each type is a component that can be classified as either a local tree or an exact local tree. Let networks µ x and µx be the components associated with respectively types x,x ∈ X.
We will focus on three particular moves:
• Pairwise deletion of a link : Suppose two links ιι , jj ∈ µ are deleted and agents ι and j have respectively type x andx; thus the two links are not from the same component. Let the new network that results from removal of the links be denotedμ = µ\{ιι , jj }.
• Pairwise formation of a link across types: This move presumes that both agents are also deleting a link. We denote this as a move where agents ι and j form a link:μ =μ ∪ {ιj}.
• Double pairwise formation of a link across types: When two links are formed across types in µ this corresponds to a non-pairwise deviation as it requires four coalition members.
We denote this as a move where both agents ι and j as well as ι and j form a link:
Finally let i denote a generic agent of type x. Let the shortest path in µ from i to either ι or ι be denotedp i wherep i = min(p iι (μ), p iι (μ)). Whenp i = 0 then either i = ι or i = ι .
Basic properties
We exploit that µ is a local tree (see Definition 11). Throughout the remainder of the paper let r = r n,κ (see Equation 52 ). We express each agent's number of paths of length p as a function of the number of agents and the degree quota:
where 1 =r (p) is the Dirac measure of whether p = r. Using the local tree structure we can express utility without transfers of each agent:
Exact local trees
Recall exact local trees are local trees where ∆#(n, κ) = 0. We will argue that this entails that exact local trees have the essential property that for every pair of agents there is a unique shortest path of at most length r and the number of paths for every agent is prescribed by Equation 53.
This can be deducted as follows.
Note first that the fact that the number of walks with at most length r starting in a given
Recall also that local trees has the property that all agents are reached within distance r. Moreover exact local trees has the property that for any agent i it holds that n − 1 = r p=1 # p i (µ); thus every shortest path with distances less than or equal to r must be a unique path between the two particular agents.
The uniqueness and countability of paths can be used to infer the losses when links are either removed or added to an exact local tree. The deletion of link ιι implies that any pair of agents i, i whose (unique) shortest path in µ includes the link ιι will have a new shortest routing path. For exact local trees we can exactly determine the length of the new path. Let i be the agent whose distance to ι is least and let i be the agent whose distance to ι is least, i.e. p iι (µ) < p iι (µ) and p i ι (µ) < p i ι (µ).
First when link ιι is deleted we can show there is no shortest path between i and i inμ with length below 2r −p i −p i ; that is there is no ii whose shortest path in µ includes ιι such that p ii (μ) < 2r −p i −p i . Suppose this was not true. Then there would exist an agent j who (1) is on the new shortest path between i and i inμ and (2) whose shortest path to agents ι and ι does not include the link ιι and (3) such that
As by construction p iι (µ) < p iι (µ) and p i ι (µ) < p i ι (µ) then the expression above is equivalent to:
. As the shortest path between i and ι as well as between i and ι are unchanged from µ toμ it follows that we can further rewrite into:
However, the above statement implies that in network µ that either ι or ι has two paths with lengths of at most r but this violates the definition of exact local trees.
We can now show that when link ιι is deleted the new shortest path between i and i inμ has a length of exactly 2r −p i −p i . This is shown by demonstrating there is an agent j such that p ji (μ) = r −p i and p ji (μ) = r −p i . This can be shown follows. Suppose that p ji (μ) = r −p i .
We will demonstrate that p ji (μ) = r −p i . As p ji (μ) = r −p i it follows that p jι (μ) = r. From the definition of exact local trees there must exist a path of length less than r between j and ι in network µ. As argued in the paragraph above neither of these paths can be strictly shorter than r and consequently they must both be exactly r.
The number of shortest paths of length p which become altered for agent i is (κ − 1) p−p i −1 for p =p i , .., r − 2, r − 1. This can be demonstrated as follows. If agent p iι (µ) = r and p iι (µ) = r then no shortest paths are altered; this is clear as agent i as none of the unique shortest paths includes ιι as they have at most length r. If instead p iι (µ) = r − 1 then the unique shortest path from i to ι includes ιι is the last link; this implies a new shortest path if ιι is deleted. Thus if p iι (µ) = r − 1 then one shortest path of length r is lost. When p iι (µ) = r − 2 then one path of length r − 1 is lost by the same argument; moreover κ − 1 paths that has ιι as the second last link. By induction this can be done at higher order and thus for shorter distances. Using the number of rerouted paths shown above we can establish the total number of shortest paths in networkμ for agent i that has a length of p:
By combining the count of shortest paths rerouted with their new length we can generalize the loss for any agent from the deletion of link ιι when all agents are homogeneous of type x:
We can aggregate the losses across homogeneous agents of type x and we arrive at the following expression:
Exact local trees -gains from linking across types We move on to establishing the gains of establishing a link in a perfectly sorted network where each component is an exact local tree.
The gains to agents ι and j of forming a link ιj are direct benefits and the new indirect connections that are accessed through the link ιj. For agent ι the benefits from forming a link with j can be computed with Equation 54 where the input length is added one (as ιj is added to the shortest path). Recallμ = µ ∪ {ιj}\{ιι , jj }.
The above expression is relevant for evaluating the pairwise gains as it captures individual benefits for a pairwise formation of a link by ι and j. However, we are also interested in the sub-connected network as it allows to assess the efficiency. Suppose instead now that ι and j also form a link; thus ιj, ι j are formed while ιι , jj are deleted. Letμ = µ ∪ {ιj, ι j }\{ιι , jj }.
Let i be an agent of type x and letp i still denote the least distance to either ι or ι . We can calculate the benefits for i when ιj, ι j are formed. The benefits are the indirect connections to agents of typex with whom agent i has no connections in µ. The aim is to count the number of paths of a given length.
For a given agent i of the other typex it must hold that the shortest path inμ between i, i either contains the link ιj or the link ι j , and thus the distance can be computed as follows:
We further restrict the above expression. We can use that i and i of typex can be at most 2r + 1 away from each other. This follows from the fact that p iι (μ) + p iι (μ) = 2r and p i j (μ)+p i j (μ) = 2r. As p iι (μ)+p iι (μ) = 2r and ιj, ι j ∈μ then it must be that p ij +p ij = 2r+2.
These facts together entail we can rewrite Equation 58:
From the above expression it follows that p ii ≤ 2r + 1 as the expression is maximized for p ij + p i j = 2r + 1.
The number of shortest paths from i through ιj to agents of the other typex can be found using Equation 54 for agent ι adding extra distance 1 +p i : 25
• for distance p ∈ {1 +p i , ..., r + 1 +p i } there are (κ − 1) p−1−p i agents;
• for distance p ∈ {r + 2 +p i , ..., 2r + 1} there are (κ − 1) 2r+1−(p−1−p i ) .
The shortest paths from i not routed through ι but instead through ι are those where p + 1 +p i > 2r + 1; from Equation 59 we know the new shortest path length is 4r + 2 − p − 1 −p i . The number of shortest paths through ι in networkμ will be (κ − 1) 2r+1−(p−1−p i ) and the new length 4r + 2 − p − 1 −p i . These facts together imply:
(κ − 1) p−1−p i , p ∈ {pi + 1, .., r + 1 +pi}, (κ − 1) 2r+1−p−p i , p ∈ {r +pi + 2, .., 2r + 1}, (κ − 1) p+p i −2r−1 , p ∈ {2r + 1 −pi, .., 2r}.
From the number of paths above we can derive the change in utility from when ιj, ι j are 25 Shortest paths from i must contain both ιj and every link in the shortest path from i to j.
added to the network for a given agent i of type x. 
By aggregating over all agents of type the gain in benefits by forming ιj, ι j is as follows: 
Local trees
We can use the analysis above on exact local trees to bound the gains and losses for (non-exact) local trees. Recall that exact local trees has the property that ∆#(n, κ) = 0 and for non-exact local trees ∆#(n, κ) > 0. Thus the difference between exact and non-exact local trees is that for a given agent the number of connected other agents at exactly distance r is lower for non-exact local trees.
Using the analysis of exact local trees we can compute the bounds on loss of utility for a given agent in the local when a link is deleted -this is done by reusing Equation 54 as follows.
We can discount the number of agents initially at distance r by ∆#(n, κ). Moreover, the new distance between agents i and i after deletion of the link ιι is at least min(p ii , 2r − 2 −p i −p i ) at most 2r −p i −p i . 26 From these two facts we can derive the bound on loss of utility when ιι is deleted. The upper bound on loss (in terms of magnitude) is when new shortest paths have most distance, i.e. 2r −p i −p i ; the lower bound is found when new distance is least, i.e. 
Fact 2. If µ is perfectly sorted and consists of |X| components that each constitute a local tree with n/|X| agents, then for any agent i of type x wherep i > 0:
26 The upper bound follows from the fact that for any two agents i and i in the local tree there is still always an agent j at distances pij = r −pi and p i j = r −p i . The lower bound can be established by repeating an argument used for exact local trees. If the new distance between two agents i and i after deletion of ιι had been less than min(p ii (µ), 2r − 2 −pi −p i ) then the following would be true. There would be multiple shortest paths of length less than or equal to r − 1 between either (ι and j) or (ι and j). This would violate the property of local trees that all shortest paths of length ≤ r − 1 are unique. As it holds that 2r − (l + 1) −p i < 2r − (l + 1) +p i and it holds that l − 1 +p i < 2r − (l − 1) −p i (equivalent to l < r + 1 −p i ) the above inequality is satisfied.
We can also derive bounds on the gains from connecting across types for local trees. We will not do this explicitly but instead use Definition 12 on symmetric losses in local trees. This allows to express our next result:
Fact 3. For the perfectly sorted network µ which consists of |X| network components which each constitute a local tree of n/|X| agents that has symmetric losses then it holds that for agents i, ι of type x andp i > 0
Proof. It holds that u ι (μ) − u ι (μ) ≥ u ι (μ) − u ι (μ) asμ ⊆μ (thus all shortest paths inμ cannot have a length that exceeds that inμ). Therefore it suffices to show:
As the local tree has symmetric losses it follows that u ι (μ) − u ι (μ) = u ι (μ) − u ι (μ); this follows from the fact that they both gain an equal number of new shortest paths through j, j , this follows as as j, j have same number of paths after deletion of jj due to symmetric losses.
This entails that without loss of generality we can assume that p iι =p i as otherwise we could substitute ι with ι and conduct the analysis again.
For ι and some agent i of typex it holds that p ii (μ) ≤ p ιi (μ)+p i . This follows as there exists a path between i, ι and ι, i with respectively lengths p ιi (μ) andp i ; thus p ii (μ) ≤ p ιi (μ) +p i .
This implies the following inequality must hold:
As u ι (μ) − u ι (μ) = x i =x p ιi (μ) l=1 δ r l · z(x,x) and u i (μ) − u i (μ) = x i =x
it follows that Inequality 67 holds which proves our fact.
